Easy Innovation and the Iron Cage: Best Practice, Benchmarking, Ranking, and the Management of Organizational Creativity by H. George Frederickson
Best Practice, Benchmarking,
Ranking, and the Management
of Organizational Creativity
H. George Frederickson
An occasional paper of the 
Kettering Foundation
June 2003 
Program Officer: John Dedrick
Editor: Ilse Tebbetts
Copy Editor: Betty Frecker
Design: Long’s Graphic Design, Inc.
Publisher: Robert E. Daley
This publication is one of a series of occasional papers published 
by the Kettering Foundation, 200 Commons Road, Dayton, Ohio 
45459-2799. The Kettering Foundation is a nonprofit operating founda-
tion, chartered in 1927, that does research to learn how democracy 
can work as it should. The foundation does not make grants but 
welcomes partnerships with other institutions or individuals who are
actively working on problems of communities, politics, and education.
The interpretations and conclusions contained in this paper, unless
expressly stated to the contrary, represent the views of the author 
or authors and not necessarily those of the foundation, its trustees,
or officers.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank John Nalbandian, Joseph Freeman,
John Bryson, Lawrence O’Toole, and William Gormley. They read and 
critiqued earlier versions of this essay and it is much the better for it.
Copyright© 2003 by the Kettering Foundation
 
EASY INNOVATION AND THE IRON CAGE: 
BEST PRACTICE, BENCHMARKING, 
RANKING, AND THE MANAGEMENT 
OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
CREATIVITY
H. George Frederickson
The search for the best is the enemy of the good.
— Voltaire
The modern belief that corporate innovation can be man-
aged begins with the Xerox Narrative, a master narrative, told
and retold in boardrooms across America. It is the tale of how,
beginning in the mid-1980s, Xerox saved itself by using what
came to be known as best practices and benchmarking. The
narrative tells how a group of high-level Xerox “change agents”
created the Central Logistics and Assets Management (CLAM)
unit, which systematically surveyed Xerox’s competitors,
identified the best of their work processes, labeled them “best
practices,” and used them as benchmarks against which their
own products and processes were measured (Camp, 1995).
Xerox stock rose from a low of $7.80 per share in the early
1990s, to $68.00 by January 1999. The company won the
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in recognition of the
logic of best practice and benchmarking. The Xerox Narrative
became the predicate for all subsequent treatments of man-
aged innovation. By 1994, it could be said that:
The simple fact is that benchmarking has been driv-
en substantially by the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award, in which the need for benchmarking
1
is a stated requirement in the application criteria.
While the benchmarking requirement is specifically
called for in Section 2.2 of the Baldrige award, the
need for benchmarking is mentioned more than 200
times in the 1994 criteria. Directly or indirectly,
benchmarking affects up to 50 percent of the award’s
scoring and, therefore, is seen as a critical quality
tool (Camp, 1995).
The Xerox Narrative and the logic of best practice and
benchmarking as institutionalized in Baldrige Award criteria
have formed a hegemony reinforced by subsequent Baldrige
winners — Ford, Alcoa, AT&T, DuPont, IBM, Johnson &
Johnson, Kodak, and Texas Instruments. By the mid-1990s,
the Xerox Narrative and the devices of best practice and bench-
marking had become part of the belief system of management
consultants, conferences, symposia, and training courses.
In the corporate world, the widely shared belief that inno-
vation, like all else, is manageable has become part of the 
general business ethos. Benchmarking, best practice, and 
the pressure of rankings and prizes inform that ethos and its
attendant narratives and myths. And, as always, that general
business ethos has migrated to the public and nonprofit 
sector. This essay is an exploration of the colonization of the
public and nonprofit sectors by the modern business ethos. It
describes how attempts to manage innovation have combined
with organizational rankings and other expressions of status,
to enter an iron cage, which reduces rather than enhances the
prospects for institutional innovation.
The Xerox Narrative seemed to confirm Moore’s Law, the
observation that the density of silicon chips closely follows a
curve, showing that the information storable on a given amount
of silicon has roughly doubled every year since the technology
was invented. This relation, first expressed in 1964 by semi-
conductor engineer Gordon Moore (who cofounded Intel),
held until the late 1970s, at which point the doubling period
slowed to 18 months, which still holds. Moore’s Law is appar-
ently self-fulfilling. The implication is that, if one rests on one’s
laurels, somebody else, somewhere else, will build a better
chip. The more important implications of Moore’s Law are,
first, the assumption that corporate innovation is orderly and
patterned, and second, that it can be managed.
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Innovation and creativity are now highly organized and
managed. Modern communication and computing firms are
heavily invested in the research required to develop faster,
smaller, and higher-capacity technology. Pharmaceutical 
companies have large and well-funded research and develop-
ment units on the hunt for new drugs and cures. The U.S.
Department of Defense heavily invests in research and devel-
opment, seeking breakthroughs in weapons systems. In these
and many other examples, it is now generally assumed that
innovation is something that can be managed.
But history has not been kind to the master narrative. At
this writing, Xerox was in an 18-month free-fall. Its stock 
had fallen from $68 to $10, with no bottom in sight. The 
competition — Canon and Ricoh — are gobbling up market
share. Earnings are flat and the company has avoided losses
only by deep downsizing — nearly 10,000 employees or about
10 percent of its workforce. If there were an Unbaldrige
Award for the year 2003, Xerox would be a contender. It
appears that Baldrige Awards are not revoked. Yet, even in 
the face of these reversals, the Xerox Narrative rolls on.
A company that uses benchmarking, identifies good work
processes and customer services provided by other companies
in the same or somewhat similar line of business and, to put it
kindly, borrows those practices. The logic of best practices
and benchmarking assumes a competitive market. Indeed, one
of the better-known books on the subject, Robert Camp’s
Business Process Benchmarking, moves rhetoric beyond mar-
ket competition to warfare, heading each chapter with a
quote from Sun Tzu, as in Chapter 2: What to Benchmark —
“He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will
be victorious,” and Chapter 3: Whom to Benchmark — “If you
know your enemy and know yourself, your victory will not
stand in doubt.”
As presented in the accounts that flow from the master
narrative, the benchmarking process is as follows:
• Decide what to benchmark by identifying the key internal
business work processes with the largest opportunity for
improvement.
• Determine which other companies use superior work
processes and investigate them.
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• Determine the performance gap between superior work
processes identified elsewhere.
• Build acceptance for the need to improve work processes
so as to close the gap.
• Set the benchmarks of performance that will close the gap,
including, when possible, precise measurement of perfor-
mance. Implement the benchmark and performance plan.
• Update benchmarks to stay current and competitive.
Although it is dressed up in a new language, benchmarking
is little more than the practice of hard-nosed business compe-
tition, tighter internal controls, and a keener knowledge of a 
changing world.
We should applaud benchmarking and other improved
business practices because they attempt to improve the prod-
ucts we buy, the services we receive, and the value of our
stock portfolios. There may even be some reason to think that
setting up the Baldrige Award office in the U.S. Department of
Commerce is useful. The award is given annually to business-
es, government agencies (in the federal government it is called
the President’s Award for Quality) and nonprofit organizations.
From 1988 to 1997, publicly traded Baldrige Award winners
outperformed the market by 2.7 to 1. Since then, however,
they have not done as well and, at this writing, were trading
at about the same as the S&P 500. Baldrige Award applicants
are evaluated on a 1,000-point scale that is loaded up with
benchmarking, strategic planning logic, and other techniques
for presuming to manage innovation. There are 110 points for
leadership; 80 points for strategic planning; 80 points for 
customer and market focus; 80 points for information and
analysis; 100 points for work systems, training, and employee
satisfaction; 100 points for work process management; and
450 points for business results — the bottom line (Blazy,
1998). These criteria simply assume that leadership, customer
focus, good systems of information, analysis and training, and
well-developed strategic planning are clearly associated with
corporate innovation and creativity. Because such criteria fair-
ly describe well-managed companies, it is assumed the same
criteria also describe innovative companies.
Innovation comes from novus, or new, and is understood
to be the introduction of something new, a novelty, a changed
way of doing things. The questions are: Does managed innova-
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tion work? Does it cause or even encourage originality? Does
it cause or even encourage innovation? The answer to these
questions is mostly, No. The exuberant CEO and boardroom
embrace of benchmarking as the key to the corporate manage-
ment of innovation runs almost directly contrary to what we
actually know about how innovation really works in complex
organizations, the subject to which we now turn.
II
It is our good fortune that there are three richly document-
ed studies of corporate innovation and creativity. Unlike the
Xerox Narrative, these studies reject benchmarking and strate-
gic planning as the keys to corporate innovation and find
those keys hidden in other places. The first, Breakthroughs!
by P. Rangamath Nayak and John P. Ketteringham, is a study 
of 14 commercial innovations so significant and lasting as to 
constitute breakthroughs. The authors’ studies included 
significant innovations in products, services, and industrial
processes among them — the compact disc, the VCR, the
ulcer drug Tagamet®, the CAT scan, overnight airmail pack-
age service (Federal Express) and, of all things, Club Med.
They represent a broad spectrum of industries, and for this
reason the findings are important to those interested in inno-
vation and creativity — not only in the private sector, but 
also in the public and nonprofit sectors.
Nayak and Ketteringham (1994) found that breakthroughs
thrive mostly in rich soil, but grow also from barren soil,
rocky soil, or no soil at all. Breakthroughs come from organi-
zations that foster creativity as well as those with poor records
of innovation. They come from creative teams joined by their 
management, ignored by their management, supported only
belatedly by their management, misunderstood by their 
management, or castigated by their management.
Breakthroughs are not organizational creations, although
they may be helped or hindered by organizations. Once an
innovation is successful, it is eagerly claimed by the organiza-
tion and often by management consultants. Innovations are
more like works of art than works of commerce. Teams of
people who accomplish breakthroughs behave more like 
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disciples emerging from the tutelage of a great visionary than
like the graduates of a prestigious management curriculum.
The authors’ findings contradicted their own preconcep-
tions about what makes for truly exceptional businesses. They
first found one common element among those businesses: “a
core ideology — core values and a sense of purpose beyond
just making money.”
James C. Collins and Jerry L. Porras in Built to Last:
Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, is a report on a 6-
year study of 18 companies including IBM, Sony, Wal-Mart 
and Walt Disney.
What did these companies have in common? Charismatic
and visionary leadership? Complex strategic planning 
processes? Briliant or elegant mission statements? An overrid-
ing commitment to maximizing profits? None of the above.
The authors’ findings contradicted their own preconcep-
tions about what makes for truly exceptional businesses. They
first found one common element among those businesses, “a
core ideology — core values and a sense of purpose beyond
just making money.”
Collins and Porras are quick to point out that such core 
values are not the same from company to company, nor are
they necessarily those we would regard as enlightened or
humanistic — although sometimes they are. Nevertheless,
great and enduring business institutions are organized around
a “cultlike” devotion to a set of values that gives those compa-
nies their reason for being and command the dedication of
their employees.
Adherence to core values does not mean that visionary
companies resist change or are strategically conservative.
Indeed, such companies use what the authors call “big hairy
audacious goals” to stay energized and challenged.
The best moves in advancing those goals do not necessarily
follow from systematic planning. Visionary companies accom-
modate lots of inefficiency in the pursuit of excellence. They
encourage experimentation, seize opportunities even when
they don’t fit into the strategic plan, and take advantage of the
accidental. What, in retrospect, looks like the result of pre-
scient planning is sometimes the happy outcome of a policy
of, as the authors put it, “Let’s just try a lot of stuff and keep
what works.”
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Clayton M. Christensen’s recent The Innovator’s Dilemma:
When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail studies
innovation in leading and surviving companies. His first and
most provocative finding is that customer responsiveness does
not lead to innovation because customers seldom know or can
even imagine what they do not now need. The Internet and 
e-commerce had its origins in the minds of information tech-
nology and computer folks who imagined Internet capability
and only worried later about how it might be made commer-
cially viable. While the power of the Internet is everywhere
evident, its commercial applications are being sorted out —
some firms survive and flourish; others do not.
Christensen calls their innovations a form of “disruptive
technology.” Disruptive technology is often rejected by an 
institutional culture built on decades of profitability based 
on known and understood markets. Therefore, as a company
manages better and better to respond to those markets it is
less and less able to invest in risky and unproven disruptive
technology. Christiansen found successful organizations 
tend to be particularly intolerant of failure and risk born 
out of experimentation, which can lead to failure. Finally,
Christensen gives the edge to smaller emergent firms because
they are responding to inchoate emerging markets, something
that seldom makes sense to established corporate leaders.
Despite their endowments in technology, brand names,
manufacturing prowess, management experience, distribution
muscle, and just plain cash, successful companies populated
by good managers have a genuinely hard time doing what 
does not fit their model for how to make money. Because dis-
ruptive technologies rarely make sense during the years when
investing in them is most important, conventional managerial
wisdom at established firms constitutes an entry and mobility
barrier that small-firm entrepreneurs and investors can bank
on. It is powerful and pervasive.
Easily, the best study of innovation in the public and non-
profit sector is Paul C. Light’s Sustaining Innovation: Creating
Nonprofit and Government Organizations that Innovate
Naturally. He defines innovation in public and nonprofit 
settings as “an act that challenges the prevailing wisdom as it
creates public values.” After a 5-year search, 26 Minnesota 
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institutions were culled from a much longer list based on a 
history of sustained innovation. Each institution was studied 
in depth, including site visits and interviews. The sample
included 8 governmental and 18 nonprofit institutions ranging
from large state agencies, to tiny nonprofits, to county govern-
ments, from new agencies to well-established ones, and from
the well-endowed to the grant dependent.
Many of these organizations got away with a staggering
amount of confusion with regard to chains of command.
Although there are preferred ways to organize internal struc-
ture, absolute clarity about just who is the boss is not one of
the prescriptions for successful innovation. In fact, these
groups achieved relatively low returns from structural reforms.
While the conventional wisdom is that organizations should
reorganize to flatten their hierarchies, rewire their organiza-
tion charts and generally make things fit, most of the organiza-
tions in the study did quite well without such restructuring.
Leaders of the 26 organizations were not naïve about
human nature. Most had stories of employees gone wrong 
and ideas lost to jealousy and bitterness. But they chose to 
see the positive potential in each employee rather than the
negative. They designed for innovation, even as they made
sure their organizations had the systems to limit damage.
Paul Light calls it a rigorous optimism. They created that 
optimism by adopting practices that helped them achieve
innovative leadership.
Innovating organizations need not be perfect. An innovat-
ing organization can do many things imperfectly and still 
succeed. It can get by with too many job classifications or 
too few; it can survive with a state-of-the-art computer 
system or none at all. What it cannot survive is poor financial
management systems and a lack of concern for outcomes.
The former is essential both for preventing financial disaster
and for creating room for investment, and the latter is an
absolute requirement for changing from compliance-based 
to performance-based accountability.
Light found that there are no gimmicks or shortcuts to
innovation. Instead, real innovative institutions get there by
practicing good old-fashioned democratic organization and
management. His conclusions, like those of the previously
cited researchers, make no mention of best practices, bench-
 
marking, or other parts of the logic of managed innovation.
Continuing success in innovation is based on four core 
values that sound like a combined Sunday school lesson and
management consultant’s manual. Light found that the core val-
ues shared by surviving innovative institutions were trust 
in employees, clients, and partners; honesty about the 
organization’s mission and about who makes decisions; rigor in
internal management and outcome evaluation; and, faith 
in the purposes of the organization and its possibilities.
According to Light, innovation is more likely a result of good
democratic administration than a result of attempts to directly
manage it. (See also Frederickson and Johnston, 1999.)
III
The empirically reliable knowledge of institutional innova-
tion and creativity is complemented by a robust understanding
of the diffusion of innovation. Best practice and benchmarking
are not so much the management of innovation as they are the
management of the diffusion of innovation.
Doubtless, the ultimate study is Everett M. Rogers’ Diffusion
of Innovations, published in 1962, 1971, and 1983. Innovation
diffusion exhibits a common pattern — an S-curve (as seen 
in the diagram below). At first the adoption of innovation is 
slow, with experimentation, trial and error, and the challenges
of being the guinea pig. Once a few others successfully adopt
an innovation, there tends to be a steep climb in adoption,
followed by a leveling off. When an innovation reaches the 
leveling-off stage, investments in seeking additional adopters
are usually wasted.
9Easy Innovation and the Iron Cage
Rate of 
Adoption
Time
Original innovations and their diffusion are often responses
to crises. In the absence of crises, the risks associated with
innovations appear to outweigh the benefits. Innovative ideas
that are relatively easy to describe, characterize, and build
into narratives are more readily accepted.
Original innovators and early adopters reap the greatest
rewards and have the highest status. They tend to be younger
and come from newer institutions. Innovators inside institu-
tions are perceived by others and by themselves as deviant.
Most professionals may not be innovators but most are carri-
ers, as anyone who has attended a professional conference
can attest. Consultants are also innovation carriers who
interact with top management and are part of the attempts 
to “cause” innovation from the top down, innovations that 
seldom last.
IV
One would assume that the good empirical research on
innovation in private, public, and nonprofit institutions as
well as the considerable scholarly research on the diffusion 
of innovation would have informed the best practice/bench-
marking and other managed innovation literature. Wrong.
Understandings of corporate innovation in the business ethos
are based on the repetition of stories such as the Xerox
Narrative, uncritical analysis, short-run conclusions resting 
on thin data, and myth. Written by management consultants,
business gurus, and ghost writers for CEOs, the best prac-
tice/benchmarking literature has the mesmerizing influence 
of enthusiasm for perceived successful innovations and the
beguiling quality that jargon and salesmanship can bring to a
subject. The lack of detailed knowledge of presumed success-
ful innovations and their verification has not held back best
practice/benchmarking momentum.
All three of the cited studies of business innovation and 
the 1999 Paul Light study of government and nonprofit 
innovation, as well as many studies of the diffusion of organi-
zational innovation, form a pattern. It reveals that innovation
can occur in organized and managed settings but that there is
a disconnect between the logic of managed innovation and,
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as Light puts it, sustained innovation (1998). Both approaches
share an emphasis on the organization’s mission, on encourag-
ing some risk taking and forgiving failed risks, on outcomes
and performance, on a call for ideas or a marketplace of ideas,
and on customers or clients.
The disconnect lies in the emphasis on traditional strategic
planning, on the formalized importing of the innovations of
others, on goal clarification, on order, on the visions of lead-
ers, and on the advice of consultants found in the logic of
managed innovation.
The evidence for sustained innovation, on the other hand,
describes relatively untidy, even chaotic work environments.
Such creative places avoid an overemphasis on planning,
and emphasize doing and experimenting. While there is an 
emphasis on performance, it falls far short of a preoccupation
with measuring it. Such creative places practice high decen-
tralization, employee ownership of the processes of work,
and leadership that is at once decisive and highly democratic
and communicative. Put simply, one approach assumes 
innovation can be managed, and the other assumes the
organization must be managed, and if it is rightly managed 
it will innovate.
V
The staying power of the Xerox Narrative is associated 
with something new, itself an innovation. Xerox did not
plan or anticipate it, but management consultants selling 
best practice/benchmarking certainly capitalized on it.
This innovation was gaining momentum in the early 1990s,
climbing rapidly up the S-curve at about the time the Xerox
Narrative was taking form. Its name: ranking.
The ranking business has soared in the past ten years. A
week does not pass without a newspaper headline about the
most dangerous cities, the best HMOs, the worst airline on-
time records, the best companies to work for, and which local
schools are best and worst. Magazine covers hold out the
promise that one will learn which are the best colleges, best
graduate schools, best retirement places, safest cities, and
other forms of “news you can use.” Our work world is filled
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with measures of performance, outcomes, results, quality, and
descriptions of best, as distinct from worst, practices. Using
the logic of organizational performance evaluations, school 
districts are being disaccredited, deans are being replaced
because their schools slipped in ranking, and mayors, hospital
administrators, university presidents, and school superinten-
dents are crowing about being number one or in the top ten.
Or they are on the defensive, describing what must be done 
in the future to improve rankings. Rankings are the fashion 
of the day. They are everywhere and they are powerful. It
seems that everything can be ranked.
Consumer products have been ranked for a long time.
Cars, refrigerators, toothpaste, and bread makers are tangible,
easily tested, and easy to compare. Consumer product mea-
surement is nuanced, providing not just an overall ranking 
but measures of reliability, appearance, convenience, safety,
and cost. Who among us does not delight in a best buy? In
response to corporate power and advertising, the Consumers
Union was born in 1936 and is still the best known and 
most respected consumer product evaluation outfit. There 
is no question that firms producing tangible consumer prod-
ucts are influenced by the evaluation and ranking of their
products, inasmuch as their success in the marketplace 
may turn on how the ranking of their products influence 
consumer choices.
Awards, prizes, and honors are a form of measurement,
evaluation, and comparison, based on the assumption that
such awards recognize the best of something. The Nobel
Prizes are loose forms of measurement, setting the bar for stan-
dards and accomplishment. Consider the Pulitzer Prize in jour-
nalism, the Academy Awards in motion pictures, the Newbery
Award for children’s literature, the National League of Cities
All America Cities Awards, the Harvard Government
Innovation Awards, and the MacArthur “genius” grants. In 
virtually every field of human endeavor there is now at least
one prize, award, or honor. These awards are very popular
and often influential to those who compete (usually rather
subtly) for them. James D. Watson’s wonderful little book 
The Double Helix is at one level the first description of DNA,
but at another level it is a description of a race with other 
scientists, particularly Linus Pauling, to get there first, know-
ing a Nobel Prize was waiting.
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Systems of accreditation are used in virtually every profes-
sional field as measures of organizational adherence, or failure
to measure up to agreed-upon standards. Certification and
licensing serve as measures of individual competence in these
same fields. If a hospital or a school is disaccredited or an 
individual is disbarred or has his or her license revoked, it 
is a measure of having fallen below standards of acceptable 
professional competence.
Tests are the coin of the realm for those who seek universi-
ty and graduate school admissions and those who seek to
enter the professions. Testing, including test preparation, is
now a very big business. Tests are not only individual, they
are aggregated to determine the assumed quality of an entire
public school or public school district, or the quality of an
entering law or business school class compared to the aggre-
gate test scores of those admitted to other law or business
schools. Universities and testing organizations are giant 
gatekeepers not just to the professions, but as arbiters of a
student’s future prospects (Lehman, 1999; Sacks, 2000).
We now expect the measurement of results in virtually all
fields of human endeavor, including such difficult-to-predict
fields as scientific research and development — as in measur-
ing the progress toward the cure for AIDS and in philanthropy
— as in setting goals for grants and measuring progress
toward goals resulting from grants.
Rankings and performance evaluations are made by many
organizations. Universities measure student performance.
Professional associations such as the Bar Association, the
American Medical Association, and many others act as self-
governing peers, setting the standards and keeping the gates,
as well as participating in, and controlling, accreditation.
Many government agencies, particularly at the state and 
federal levels, control licensing and certification of both 
individuals and organizations in a form of regulatory control
and oversight, often with publicly appointed boards and 
commissions. In 1993, the federal government passed, and
President Clinton signed, the Government Results and
Performance Act (GRPA), which requires all agencies to 
develop long-range strategic plans and specific goals, as 
well as descriptions of the measures to be used to gauge
progress toward those goals.
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Many nonprofit organizations practice rankings and per-
formance evaluations, including the professional associations
described above. The Consumers Union and the Underwriters
Laboratories (U.L.) are nonprofits. Philanthropies are also 
nonprofits and appear to be moving in the direction of 
funding organizations that do rankings and performance 
evaluations and ask them to measure the results. Virtually all
government grants now require outcome evaluations. The
rankings or report cards on the quality of state and large-
city administration, conducted by the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University and pub-
lished in the privately held Governing Magazine, are funded
by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The Harvard Government
Innovation Awards, funded by the Ford Foundation, are pub-
lished annually and distributed broadly in an effort to encour-
age a diffusion of innovation. The largest testing organizations,
the Educational Testing Service, and the field or profession-
specific testing organizations, are almost all nonprofits. But
the testing and educational preparation organizations such as
Kaplan and Sylvan are profit-making (they hope) corporations.
Private firms have moved vigorously into the ranking 
and performance evaluation business, particularly the maga-
zine companies. The regular U.S. News & World Report and
Newsweek rankings in higher education have swamped 
the Gorman Report in the way that large firms swamp small 
companies. Many private rankers are freelance cottage 
industries such as Gorman. In the public or governmental
world, the best known of these is the Morgan-Quintno
Company in Lawrence, Kansas, which publishes annual 
rankings of virtually every bit of available data comparing 
the 50 states and the American cities. They also rank cities 
by safety, civility, and so forth. Libraries are Morgan-Quintno’s
largest customers because their publications are annual 
and have many of the characteristics of reference books 
and almanacs.
Interest groups (which are usually nonprofit organizations)
also engage in rankings. The Sierra Club ranks legislators one
way, while forest, mineral, and hunting groups rank them
another. The pro- and anti-gun control groups engage in the
war of the rankings. Less becoming is the evidence that the
commercial package carriers (UPS, FedEx, etc.) do annual and
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always negative evaluations of the U.S. Postal Service, and they
use these evaluations on Capitol Hill to attempt to diminish
the credibility of the U.S. Postal Service. The commercially
owned electric utilities use rankings and performance evalua-
tions to discredit the publicly owned electric utilities, always
urging that they be privatized, which would, of course, make
them easy prey for large commercial electric utilities. There 
is even some evidence that the relatively new private educa-
tion industry has, at times, been associated with negative 
evaluations of public schools, and particularly inner-city 
public schools.
Rankings and performance evaluation are done in a variety
of ways. For tangible consumer products, there are actual 
laboratory tests. For measures of individual scholarly develop-
ment, there are general and field-specific tests at virtually 
all levels of schooling. The tests themselves are regularly evalu-
ated and critiqued. In recent years, testing has been moving
from pen-and-paper technology to Internet platforms. The
rankings of entire schools or programs are simply aggregates of
the individual scores of students or applicants, compared with
previous years and with other schools or programs. States
gather those data and set benchmarks; schools that fall below
benchmarks may be disaccredited. Based on aggregate test
scores in successive years, measured against a preestablished
and fixed minimum standard (a benchmark) in the summer 
of 2000, the state of Missouri put the schools of both Kansas
City and St. Louis on probation and threatened them with 
disaccreditation. That Kansas City and St. Louis are the two
large inner-city, primarily minority school districts in Missouri
— the only ones disaccredited — has resulted in second
thoughts among the legislators who wrote the law and the
public servants who must implement it. Second thoughts
appear to take this form: At the time it seemed to be a good
idea. Now what do we do? Doubtless, Missouri will need to fix
the ranking scheme as New York State fixed its teacher accred-
itation test (more than half failed) and Texas fixed its student
graduation tests program.
The staple of many ranking systems is the opinion question-
naire or survey of citizen, client, or customer satisfaction. U.S.
News & World Report and Newsweek use surveys in their col-
lege and university rankings, as do organizations that rank air-
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travel satisfaction or government-service satisfaction.
Finally, in the more subjective fields of rankings, forms of
peer review are widely used. Awards, prizes, and honors
almost always use peer evaluations. The choices of articles to
be accepted or rejected for publication in leading scholarly
journals, a form of ranking, are always made by qualified
peers. Tenure may be in the balance for the young professor.
The choice of government grant recipients is always peer
reviewed, endowing peers in each discipline with the power
to measure quality.
Assumptions made on the part of those who do the rank-
ings and give the awards determine the results. In much the
same way that the audience must accept the straight line in
order for the joke to be funny, the salience of rankings rest on
the assumptions made by the rankers. Ranking assumptions
are, of course, the issue with respect to the alleged cultural
bias of student testing as well as the issue in virtually all criti-
cism of rankings. To deal with challenges to assumptions,
ranking organizations use prestigious universities to set the
assumptions and make the rankings or choose the winners.
For cities and states, the Maxwell School used the follow-
ing good-management assumptions:
• Financial management systems that include multiyear per-
spective on budgeting;
• Mechanisms that preserve stability and fiscal health;
• Sufficient financial information available to policymakers,
managers, and citizens, and appropriate control over 
financial operations;
• Human resource systems that emphasize strategic analysis,
attracting needed employees, maintaining a skilled work 
force and a civil service structure;
• Information technology systems stressing a coherent archi-
tecture for information technology systems, meaningful,
multiyear information technology planning, and informa-
tion technology training;
• Capital management systems including a thorough analysis 
of future needs, monitoring, and evaluation of capital 
projects, and the maintenance of capital assets; and
• Managing for results including strategic planning, data that
can measure progress, use of results data by managers for
policy-making and management, and clear communication
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with stakeholders.
Using these criteria, jurisdictions are graded in each 
category and overall. An editorial in the Kansas City Star
(2000) considered the grade given Kansas City, Missouri:
Kansas Citians shouldn’t be too pleased by the recent
grade handed out to City Hall for the quality of its
governmental operations. Kansas City received an
overall grade of B-, placing it right in the middle of
the pack of 35 cities that were exhaustively evaluated
by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs at Syracuse University and Governing
Magazine. The overall grade for the city was disap-
pointing in this respect: The veteran management
team led by City Manager Bob Collins should have
done a better job handling longstanding problems in
the areas outlined by the survey. The flip side of this
argument is that Collins has the opportunity to put in
place new, change-oriented managers as department
directors leave. The most recent departure was of
Fire Chief Rick Brisbin. Staying on a positive note,
Mayor Kay Barnes, Collins, and other city officials
recently have highlighted ways to improve the deliv-
ery of basic services and how public employees are
trained. If these programs are carried out, Kansas
Citians will be getting more efficient use of their tax
dollars. And local government’s next report card —
scheduled to be delivered in three years — could
contain a higher grade.
No doubt other cities (as well as states and federal agen-
cies) that received mediocre grades responded in the same
way. Clearly, the rankings put pressure on jurisdictions to
improve their management, or at least get their management
to conform to the assumptions made by the rankings.
In recent years, Kansas City has purposely chosen to invest
more in neighborhood community services. Given limited
financial resources, will the relatively poor rankings of the
management of Kansas City put pressure on its leaders to
invest more in information technology and other management
needs and less in community services? Better management 
is the agenda of the funders of this ranking program, apparent-
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ly without regard to the fact that better management has
tradeoff costs, or that management must compete with other 
government needs.
The assumptions of rankers are seldom challenged. Never-
theless, some ranking assumptions are certainly open to 
criticism — as, for example, the continuing claim that re-
search is more important than teaching in giving faculty
tenure, or that student test scores are more important than
grade point averages for university and professional school
admissions. Ranking assumptions can be the battleground 
for policy debates. But more often, rankings and the assump-
tions behind them are simply assumed to be valid.
It is also abundantly evident in the response of the Kansas
City Star to the report card the city received, that such mat-
ters are highly political. Those who were not supportive of 
the incumbent city manager used these rankings as ammuni-
tion, and he has been replaced. If rankings do not improve,
whoever challenges the mayor in the next election will doubt-
less use the report card grades as an argument for why the
city needs a new mayor. Mayors, governors, deans, university
presidents, and many others subject to the whims of rankers
find themselves vulnerable and, in many cases, without the
resources to make things better. Claims of objectivity notwith-
standing, all rankings are based on assumptions, and no rank-
ings are neutral. Ranking can be perilous to careers and to
public perceptions of institutions.
James Fellows, the editor of U.S. News & World Report,
from 1995 to 1998, is one of the strongest national advocates
of the so-called civic journalism and “news you can use.” He
argues that rankings are just such news. And as anyone who
has walked by a magazine rack in the last five years would
conclude, ranking is very good journalism business. Fellows
said that their annual issue that ranks schools and colleges is,
to U.S. News & World Report, what the annual swimsuit issue
is to Sports Illustrated.
We do not know, and may never know, what effect ranking
has on quality however defined. Such things are tough to
measure.
William Gormley and David Weimer’s Organizational
Report Cards (1999) is the most thorough consideration of
those aspects of the measurement business that are distinctly
organizational. They review organizations that do perfor-
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mance measurement in child care, air travel, higher educa-
tion, economic development, employment and training, hos-
pitals, HMOs, insurance companies, nursing homes, and pub-
lic schools. They are generally positive in their evaluation of
the ranking and performance measurement movement and
conclude that “organizational report cards are here to stay.
Demands for systematic performance data from policymakers,
citizens, managers, and consumers will guarantee that. The
content, format, and impact of report cards however, will gen-
erate considerable debate.”
Rankings and report cards are, as Gormley and Weimer
(1999) rightly claim, a kind of market surrogate in 
a nonmarket setting. The authors also claim that more 
marketlike competition resulting from ranking stimulates
improvement. A highly ranked city, school district, or busi-
ness, logically should try to improve its ranking by improving
its quality. And a well-ranked city will feel pressure from
below and respond with its own improvement — assuming 
it has the resources. Competition of this kind has always 
been with us, but rankings may sharpen and focus that 
competition. Rankings may also result in “teaching to the 
test,” in a desperate attempt to lift “quality.”
It is easy, however, to miss the point: many rankings do
not really rank quality; they rank impressions of quality.
Numbers are not reality; they represent reality. Rankings are,
in fact, surrogates for quality, used in the absence of any 
reliable way to measure quality. Rankings processes pick up
not only reflections of quality, but reflections of status, bias,
political clout, and ignorance. We have learned that rankings
attract a lot of attention. We may agree that some rankings are
casual social science at best, but they are exciting and fun.
Rankings can be a postmodern wedding of simplified social
science and entertainment. Complicated matters are distilled
to simple good, better, and best categories and put into sound
bites that busy folks can easily digest without being conceptu-
ally overburdened. Rankings can also be genuine objective
comparisons of the effectiveness of institutions assuming
there are reliable data and assuming the assumptions built in
to ranking criteria are reasonable. Ranking, like most things,
can be well or poorly done.
It is now commonplace for schools, cities, nonprofits, busi-
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nesses, and universities to set out specific ranking objectives
in their strategic plans, to marry rankings and institutional
objectives. A business or law school will, for example, list
among its strategic objectives, the achievement of a rank-
ing in the top 10 or 20. Businesses will set market share 
and profit goals — a kind of ranking objective. The power 
of rankings has stimulated the logic that institutions can
improve their standing by better management and parti-
cularly by attempting to directly manage the processes of
organizational innovation.
Every state, every city, every university has similar stories
to tell. In the ranking game, assumptions are the predicate 
to rankings and they are never neutral. Rankings often consti-
tute a formidable pressure to conform to ranking assump-
tions. Rankings are not friendly to innovation, creativity,
risk taking, or doing things in new ways. When rankings get
tightly linked to efforts to further organizational innovation,
as is now everywhere evident, the results are usually less,
rather than more, innovation.
VI
Ranking, comparing, and measuring constitute a search 
for reason and understanding that grew out of Enlightenment
notions of the scientific basis of useful knowledge. Measuring
is embedded in modernist assumptions of the human capacity
to demystify and, thereby, to know in objective ways.
Performance measurement, best practice, benchmarking,
and the influence of rankings are all broadly a part of the 
family of strategic planning. The strategic-planning approach
to guiding organizational change is, without question, a useful
organizational tool. It may be that the processes of strategic
planning, as compared to the strategic plan itself, have the
most lasting effect on the organization, particularly if the
strategic-planning process is highly participative and mostly
bottom-up (Bryson, 1995). It is generally established that a
well-designed strategic-planning process can encourage inter-
action between departments, enhance levels of commitment
to shared objectives, help make organizational goals more
congruent, sort out more important goals, and challenge goal
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displacement. This is especially true for organizations with 
relatively unambiguous purposes, little goal conflict among
principals, clear control over resources and staff, and pre-
dictable outcomes. Formal strategic planning loses salience 
in organizational settings that lack these characteristics. For
example, government purposes are richly ambiguous, and 
government organizations are filled with political, regional,
philosophical, and other conflicts between and among elected
legislators and executives. Such organizations are often bereft
of bureaucratic capacity to control work processes and out-
comes. Strategic planning is, therefore, difficult to apply in the
world of government management.
Nevertheless, virtually all approaches to innovation in 
the public sector begin with the logic of strategic planning.
The 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA),
for example, obliges all federal agencies to develop a strategic
plan that brings precision to ambiguous law, reconciles com-
peting objectives, and sets out formulae by which goal
progress will be measured. The success of the federal strategic-
planning processes mandated by GPRA is mixed, but 
public managers are making every creative effort to carry 
out the law (Radin, 2000). Finally, there are indications that
managers are unable to resist inclinations to have the institu-
tional vision formulated primarily at the top and then 
to sell it to the rank and file through strategic planning
(Bryson, 1995).
Ranking, report carding, best practices, and benchmarking
are all systems of comparison, measurement, and evaluation.
In the nonmarket world of public affairs — governments,
nonprofits and nongovernmental institutions, universities, and
philanthropies — these comparative systems are modern mar-
ket surrogates. We may not buy cities or universities, or judge
the United Way or the MacArthur Foundation in the same way
we decide to buy a Ford. We do, however, use their services
and often depend on them. It is reasonable, then, to know
how to differentiate among them and make informed choices
in the absence of a market. Systems of ranking, report carding,
best practices, and benchmarking presume to help us do that.
21Easy Innovation and the Iron Cage
VII
Max Weber, the first and greatest student of complex
organizations described such organizations as iron cages, so
efficient and powerful in their capacity to control men and
women that, once established, the momentum of bureaucrati-
zation is irreversible (Weber, 1952). Generations of organiza-
tion theorists have verified and elaborated the iron cage
hypothesis, explaining why organizational innovation is less,
rather than more, likely because of best practices, benchmark-
ing, and their links to ranking.
One would logically assume that organizational change 
is driven by competition and by the need for efficiency.
Instead, organizational change in the iron cage simply makes
organizations more similar without necessarily making them
more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is why.
Isomorphism, a bit of sociological jargon, is the concept 
that best captures the iron cage and the process of organiza-
tional homogenization. Isomorphism explains the pattern of
increasing similarity, homogeneity, and congruence between
and among organizations in similar fields — all research 
universities, all armies, all software companies, all HMOs, and
so forth. Isomorphism in fields of similar organizations leads
to homogeneity among those organizations in their structures,
technologies, cultures, and outputs. The adoption of civil
service reform in U.S. cities illustrates this process. Early civil
service reforms were related to internal government needs
and strongly influenced by such city characteristics 
as the size of the immigrant population, political reform move-
ments, socioeconomic composition, and city size (Tolbert
and Zucken, 1983). Later reforms had less to do with urban
characteristics than with broadly held assumptions about 
the legitimate structural form for municipal administration.
This is because cities have become increasingly alike. As 
they copy and mimic one another, they cease to innovate 
in significant ways and enter Weber’s iron cage. The same 
isomorphic process is found in virtually all organizational
fields, largely driven by three forces: coercion, mimicry, and
contextual norms.
Coercive isomorphism is caused by pressure exerted on an
organization by another organization on which the first is
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dependent, and by the force of cultural expectations in the
society within which the organization functions. In some 
circumstances, organizational change is a direct response to
government mandate: manufacturers adopt new pollution-
control technologies to conform to environmental regulations;
nonprofits maintain accounts and hire accountants in order 
to meet tax law requirements; and, organizations employ 
affirmative-action officers to fend off allegations of discrimina-
tion. Schools mainstream special students and hire special
education teachers, cultivate PTAs, and administrators who
get along with them, and promulgate curricula that conform
to state standards.
The existence of a common legal environment affects 
many aspects of an organization’s behavior and structure.
The United States has a complex, rationalized system of 
contract law that establishes organizational controls to honor
legal commitments. Other legal and technical requirements of
the state — the budget cycle, the fiscal year, annual reports,
and financial reporting requirements that ensure eligibility 
for the receipt of federal contracts or funds — all cause orga-
nizations to behave in similar ways. A lot of organizational 
similarity can be traced to the forces of coercive isomorphism.
When organizational technologies are poorly understood,
when goals are ambiguous or when the environment is 
uncertain, organizations tend to model themselves on other
organizations (March and Olsen, 1976). The advantages of
mimicking behavior are considerable; when an organization
faces ambiguous problems or unclear solutions, it is cheaper
and quicker to model other organizations with similar prob-
lems. Finding more fundamental organizational approaches 
is expensive and takes time (Cyert and March, 1963).
Homogeneity in organizational structures and behavior is
also a function of the limited choices available. “Large organi-
zations choose from a relatively small set of major consulting
firms, which, like Johnny Appleseeds, spread a few organiza-
tional models throughout the land. Such models are powerful
because structural changes are observable, whereas changes
in policy and strategy are less-easily noticed. The history of
management reform in American government agencies, which
are noted for their goal ambiguity, is almost a textbook case 
of isomorphic modeling, from the Planning-Programming-
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Gadgeting model of the McNamara era to the zero-based 
budgeting of the Carter administration,” to contracting out in
the Reagan era, from government in the early Clinton years 
to the current search for innovation by measuring results and
best practice/benchmarking (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organiza-
tions in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or
successful. Mimicking other such organizations is a practice
that appears to have less to do with innovation and more to 
do with a search for improved reputation or standing.
A third feature of the iron cage of isomorphism is normative
and stems primarily from professionalization. Two aspects of
professionalization are important sources of isomorphism.
One is the formal education of professionals and the other is
the growth of professional networks that span organizations
and act as agents for the diffusion of ideas. Universities and
professional training institutions are important centers for the
development of organizational norms among professional 
managers and their staffs. Professional and trade associations
define and promulgate normative rules about organizational
and professional behavior. They certify, accredit, and legiti-
mate. Such processes fill a reservoir with rather similar 
individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of
organizations. This similarity in professional orientation and
disposition will often trump unique organizational traditions
and controls (Perrow, 1974).
Many professional career tracks are so closely guarded, both
at entry and throughout career progression, that individuals
who make it to the top are virtually indistinguishable. There is,
for example, an absence of variation among Fortune 500 board
members (Hirsch and Whisler, 1982). Individuals in similar
organizations are socialized to common expectations about
their personal behavior, appropriate style of dress, organiza-
tional vocabularies (Williamson, 1975), and standard methods
of speaking, joking, or addressing others (Ouchi, 1980). To 
the extent managers and key staff are drawn from the same
universities and filtered through a common set of attributes,
they will tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the
same policies, procedures, and structures as normatively sanc-
tioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the
same way. Together, they build the iron cage of isomorphism.
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The exchange of information among professionals helps
contribute to a commonly recognized hierarchy of status.
This status-ordering occurs through both formal and informal
means. The designation of a few large firms in an industry
here as key bargaining agents in union-management negotia-
tions make these central firms pivotal in other respects as
well. Government recognition of key firms or organizations
through the grant or contract process and by awards and
prizes such as the Baldrige, gives these organizations legitima-
cy and visibility and leads competing firms to copy aspects 
of their structure or operating procedures in the hope of
obtaining similar rewards. Professional and trade associations
provide other arenas in which prestige organizations are 
recognized and their personnel given positions of substantive
or ceremonial influence. The stature of managers in highly
visible businesses is reinforced by representation on the
boards of other organizations, particularly grant-giving philan-
thropies. On these boards, they often act as agents of diffu-
sion, suggesting that nonprofit organizations use business
strategies such as best practice/benchmarking. Executives and
members of the boards of directors of leading nonprofits such
as the Ford Foundation sit on government and foundation
grant award panels, consult as government- or foundation-
financed management advisers to smaller nonprofits, or sit on
smaller organizations’ boards, while their stature is reinforced 
and enlarged by the grants their nonprofits receive from 
government, corporate, and foundation-funding sources
(DiMaggio, 1983).
Upwardly mobile managers and staff seek to secure posi-
tions in central organizations in order to further their own
careers. Aspiring managers undergo socialization into the
norms and mores of the organizations they hope to join.
Career paths may also involve movement from entry positions
in the center organizations to middle-management positions 
in peripheral organizations. The flow of personnel within 
an organizational field is further encouraged by structural
homogenization — for example, the existence of common
career titles and paths (such as assistant, associate, and full
professor) with meanings that are commonly understood.
Organizational fields that include a large professionally
trained labor force will be driven primarily by status 
 
competition. Organizational prestige and resources are key
elements in attracting professionals. This process encourages
homogenization as organizations seek to ensure that they can
provide the same benefits and services as their competitors.
In the iron cage, these isomorphic processes proceed 
in the absence of evidence that they increase organizational 
efficiency. (DiMaggio, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
To the extent that organizational effectiveness is enhanced,
the reason is often that organizations are rewarded for their 
similarity to other organizations in their fields. This similarity
can make it easier for organizations to transact with other
organizations, to attract career-minded staff, to be acknowl-
edged as legitimate and reputable, and to fit into categories
that define eligibility for public and private grants and 
contracts. None of this, however, ensures that conformist
organizations are more efficient than their more deviant
peers. And worse, there is no evidence that isomorphic
processes enhance prospects for organizational innovation
and creativity; indeed, logic suggests the opposite because
isomorphic processes punish deviation.
Here are some key hypotheses drawn from the research 
on institutional isomorphism:
• The more uncertain the relationship between means and
ends, the greater the extent to which organizations will
model themselves after organizations perceived to be 
successful.
• The more ambiguous the goals of an organization, the
greater the extent to which it will model itself after organi-
zations that it perceives are successful. There are two 
reasons for this. First, organizations with ambiguous and
disputed goals are likely to be dependent on appearances
for legitimacy. Such organizations may find it to their
advantage to meet the expectations of important con-
stituencies about how they should be designed and run.
In most situations, reliance on established, legitimated 
procedures enhances organizational legitimacy and 
survival characteristics. This explains why one prestigious
research university looks almost exactly like all the others.
A second reason is found in situations where conflict 
over organizational goals is repressed in the interest of 
harmony; thus participants find it easier to mimic other
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organizations than to make decisions on the basis of 
systematic analysis of goals since such analysis is painful,
disruptive, time consuming, and expensive.
• The greater the reliance on academic credentials in 
choosing managerial and staff personnel, the greater the
extent to which an organization will become like other
organizations in its field.
• The greater the participation of organizational managers 
in trade and professional associations, the more likely 
the organization will be, or will become, like other 
organizations in its field. This hypothesis is parallel 
to the institutional view that the more elaborate the 
networks among organizations and their members,
the more likely organizations in that environment will
come to resemble each other.
• The greater the extent to which an organizational field 
is dependent on a single (or several similar) source(s) 
of support for vital resources, the higher the level of 
isomorphism.
• The greater the extent to which the organizations in a 
field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the
extent of isomorphism in the field as a whole. The current
popularity of governmental contracting and outsourcing 
is, therefore, likely contributing to isomorphism.
Prizes, rankings, and test scores are representations of 
status and legitimacy — bars in the iron cage of isomorphism.
There is every possibility that the impetus to best practices
and benchmarking is driven as much by the desire to increase
an institution’s reputational capital as it is by a genuine desire
to innovate. The iron cage of isomorphism explains the cycles
of management fads and the attraction of executives in pres-
tige organizations to consultants who claim a leading-edge
innovation, a new concept, or an answer to a vexing question.
The paradox of the iron cage is this: in their pursuit of break-
throughs, creativity, and innovations, organizations usually
converge into an essentially indistinguishable lump. In this
lump, they compete for the slightest differentiation — which
is ranked first, second, third — when in fact the distinctions
between them are very slight, if not without difference at all.
Isomorphism is actually furthered by the combination of 
managed innovation and ranking, a perverse result exactly 
 
the opposite of the reported purposes of benchmarking and 
best practice.
This critique of best practice/benchmarking and managed
innovation, may help readers gain perspective and reconsider
the logic, strength, and usefulness of these concepts. But 
criticism is easy. If not managed innovation by best practice
and benchmarks, then what? If not the iron cage, then what?
Are there better ideas for achieving institutional innovation
and, if so, is there any evidence that such ideas work better
than best practice/benchmarking? The answer is yes.
VIII
For purposes of comparison, consider the description 
of best practice/benchmarking to be the managed innova-
tion model.
Next, consider research findings on innovation and the 
diffusion of innovation as the sustaining innovation model
(Light, 1998).
How do these models differ with regard to organization
and reorganization, leadership, responsibility, goals, criteria
for performance, norms, and values, the propensity to take
risks and, most importantly, the propensity to innovate? The
table that appears on the next page presents a simplified 
comparison of the two models. The comparative emphasis 
has partly to do with differences between the use of the logic
of managed innovation in business and corporate settings and
the logic of sustaining innovation found in business as well as
governmental, nonprofit, and philanthropic settings.
Organization and Reorganization. Virtually all descrip-
tions of organizing or reorganizing for best practice/bench-
marking are expressed in terms of systems of management,
control, and delegated authority. There is little evidence of 
the application of managed-innovation logic resulting in decen-
tralization and greater work-group autonomy. Innovation
research, however, indicates that innovations are more likely
to occur in flexible, loosely coupled institutional (or noninsti-
tutional) settings.
Research on the diffusion of innovation indicates that 
there is a wide range of organizational strategies that work — 
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Comparing Managed Innovation and Sustaining Innovation Models
Managed Innovation Model Sustained Innovation Model
Organization: Designed, orderly, Loosely coupled, untidy
hierarchical
Reorganization:    Designed and planned The formalization of developments 
that are already taking place
A Leader is: The architect The “gardener” — supports
The change agent
The visionary
Responsibility:    For results To the group and in the group  
To Stockholders                             To the institution and in the institution 
To customer, citizens, clients          To external stakeholders,
present and future
Planning: Traditional strategic Innovating in a generally
management and goal-setting agreed-upon direction.
and measuring results against 
those goals.
Goals: Seek clarity, prioritize, focus           Some purposeful ambiguity  
on core mission. Set goals,
then implement them.
Linear
Criteria for 
Performance:
Time Shorter Longer
Precision Greater Lesser
Results Measuring efficiency, Instrumental effectiveness
the bottom line
Outcomes Measured precisely Estimated, debated,
A garbage can 
Process Means-ends chain
Values: Managed, guided, vision Historical, emergent, natural, shared
Propensity 
to risk: Lesser Greater
Propensity to Short, rapid, shallow Long, slow, deep cycles   
innovate: cycles of innovation  of innovations 
rather than directs
Solutions search for
problems just as often as prob-
lems search for solutions.
Questions search for answers,
answers search for questions.
Goals lead to action,
action leads to goals.
Curvelinear
managed innovation, model laws and charters, policy entrepre-
neurs, advocacy groups and, in modern times, rankings. But 
all tend toward isomorphism.
There are differing perspectives on reorganization. Managed-
innovation enthusiasts are likely to describe, advocate, and
carry out reorganization to attempt to achieve either innovation
or the diffusion of innovation. Research on institutional behav-
ior describes successful and enduring reorganization as an itera-
tive process of organizational adaptation only thought to be a
reorganization after it is well along. Sustaining innovation
assumes that form follows function.
Leadership. The Xerox Narrative, as well as its spawn,
includes heroic models of the great leader, the architect of sur-
vival, the agent of change, the visionary. All the research on the
diffusion of innovation describes the linkage between leaders or
elites, management consultants, policy advocates, and interest
groups. Managed innovation simply assumes strong, centralized,
heroic leadership. It is often the case that particularly creative
persons with breakthrough ideas start organizations — Steve
Jobs at Apple, Bill Gates at Microsoft — and become the heroic
leaders in organization narratives. The problem, of course, is
sustaining momentum, not only in the production of the origi-
nal product, but the development of new innovative products.
Organizations in the public and nonprofit sectors almost always
receive a new leader into an ongoing institutional culture.
While new businesses result from the creative energy of a single
leader, the Department of Agriculture, the state of Kansas, or
the Ford Foundation are not phased out to be replaced by new
organizations led by creative leaders. So, as we say in politics
and public management, “ya dance with who brung ya.”
Research on sustaining innovation, on the other hand,
describes leadership thus:
The institution is a political and moral order, a collec-
tion of long-lasting standard operating procedures —
reflecting values, principles, and beliefs that are
shared. The primary task of the leader is to guarantee
enough order and autonomy to enable the pursuit 
of collective purposes. Leaders are “gardeners” — 
they support rather than direct. They are obligated 
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to defend uniform and collective standards of 
appropriateness, with reference to what is best 
for the institution.
— Johan P. Olsen   
The metaphor of the leader as gardener simply would not
do in the corporate world of managed innovation. As the logic
of managed innovation migrates to governments, nonprofits,
and philanthropies, assumptions about leadership take on
greater importance. Nonbusiness institutions are inclined to
multiple and contrasting leaders, and loose power structures
that dissipate centralized power, rendering heroic leadership
assumptions of little use. It should not be imagined, however,
that there are no great leaders in government and nonprofit
institutions, because there are (Cooper and Wright, 1992).
However, these great leaders, as the best research on public
leadership shows, are more like gardeners than high-profile
visionary heroes.
Smaller and newer nonprofits such as community develop-
ment corporations, particularly those that survive and flourish,
are a bit like smaller aggressive corporations and are a major
exception to this generalization. They are often created and led
by high-energy, strong, heroic-leader types. To endure, over
time, they must routinize charisma, as Max Weber noted 
more than 50 years ago.
Responsibility and Goals. No phrase better describes the
modern conception of responsibility than Al Davis’ now famous
“just win baby.” It is the bottom line that matters most. In our
time, the bottom line is summed every quarter, every month,
every day. Searching elsewhere for best practices and applying
them through benchmarking is a bit like catching the next
good wave in a patterned response to short-run performance
pressures.
Diffusion research shows that institutional participants resist
purported innovations they have not participated in creating.
And institutions will ultimately reject purported innovations
that run counter to institutional culture and norms. There is,
in the sustained innovations model, a deep commitment to
institutional performance, but that performance grows out of 
a shared sense of responsibility in the work-group, from the
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institution to the individual and from the individual to the 
institution. As W. Edwards Deming (1988) carefully explained
in his total quality management (TQM) theory, high perfor-
mance flows from shared work-group responsibility for 
performance. Innovation happens in a steady iterative trial-
and-error fashion, but it does happen. Once such innovation
occurs, it becomes a collectively owned and enduring part 
of the institution.
Traditional strategic-planning logic — clarifying goals,
choosing the most important among them, settling on one or
two goals that best represent the institution’s core purpose,
setting up measures of how the institution will know how 
well it is achieving these goals, looking at other institutions 
to find their best practices and importing the best, and using
benchmarks — is at the heart of the managed-innovation
model. It is an organizational adaptation of stimulus-response,
means and ends, and logical positivist rationality. Based on
empirical observation, scholars and researchers long ago 
modified and softened this model with the logic of “muddling
through” and buffered rationality (Lindbloom, 1959). The com-
mon, empirically tested model is described in formal terms as
“successive limited comparisons” and is compared with the
“rational-comprehensive model,” which now has virtually no
empirical warrant. The best of modern strategic-planning 
literature reads very much like successive limited comparisons
and the sustaining-innovations model (Bryson, 1995).
Managed-innovation enthusiasts and salespersons have 
mostly ignored such dull academic findings and press on with
the rhetoric of more or less pure rational-comprehensive 
strategic planning.
Two ghosts rest in the logic of strategic planning and 
managed innovation. First is the assumption that goals are
knowable in the existential sense. On the one hand, leader-
ship theorists see goals emerging in the institutional visions of 
leaders, but the ghost of megalomania haunts institutional 
purposes (not to mention the public interest) with personal
ambition and hubris. On the other hand, TQM theorists find
goals in customer opinions and preferences. The original-
customer focus-group ideas in TQM were designed to deal with
that ghost, but TQM assumes that customers already know and
understand their needs and interests and have thought through
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all the possibilities. Development of the Internet and e-mail,
for example, are not so much responses to customer sugges-
tions for product improvement as they are innovations that,
when presented to possible customers, were in time found to
be useful. It was not customer response or strategic planning
or management that resulted in these innovations; it was 
creative people in flexible institutional settings seeing the 
possibilities. Innovation often takes the form of discovering
answers for as yet unasked questions, services for which 
there is not yet a demand, solutions searching for problems,
arrows seeking bull’s-eyes, and bull’s-eyes waiting for arrows.
Collective institutional deliberation and agreement on sensible
organizational actions are more likely to put goals into per-
spective and make them useful than are formal strategic-plan-
ning, goal-clarification exercises. Goals that are too precise
may be the enemy of innovation, thus turning the logic of 
managed innovation on its head.
Research also indicates that a certain level of goal ambiguity
leaves wiggle room, invites possibilities, and generally opens
things up. Techniques for the effective management and 
navigation of ambiguity are part of virtually all management
textbooks and courses. It is useful to reflect on “Frederickson’s
rule”: Goals are deceptive — the unaimed arrow never misses.
Criteria for Performance. How can institutions know
how well they are doing? At one level this is a temporal 
question — how well are we doing today, today compared to
yesterday, today compared to a year ago, or today projected a
month, a year, a decade ahead? The managed-innovation model
is impatient and the whole logic of best practice and bench-
marking is in a hurry. For several years, the Xerox Narrative
was confirmed by events. If written today, a Xerox Narrative
would come to the opposite conclusion. Sustaining-innovation
assumptions are, it must be admitted, luxurious with time.
Deliberation takes time. Finding consensus takes time.
Training takes time. Gardening takes time. Nevertheless,
institutions that practice widespread open deliberation, mov-
ing only after genuine consensus, investing in their people
through training and, particularly, through job security, are
more likely to nourish innovation as are institutions that 
presume to manage innovations. And innovations, thus 
nourished, are much more likely to last.
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Performance assumptions, in managed innovation, turn on
the bottom line as Baldrige Award criteria attest. In the business
world, the bottom line is not only profit and/or stock value;
it is also status and legitimacy. In the government and nonprofit
world, the criteria for performance are efficiency (accomplish-
ing the greatest possible results for the dollars available),
economy (accomplishing some fixed task, such as janitorial 
services, for the least money, which explains the love affair with
contracting out) and legitimacy. Profit, stock value, efficiency,
economy, and external legitimacy all ignore the instrumental
benefits and favorable effects on performance of widespread
participation in institutional decision making, two-way loyalty
between institutions and their employees, and a deeply shared
set of agreed-upon values and commitments. Although such
instrumental values have always been hard to measure, it is
agreed among institutional scholars, as well as innovation 
scholars, that instrumental values define organizational culture 
and broadly influence all forms of institutional performance,
including the propensity to innovate. To those invested in the
institution, deliberative instrumentality is, all by itself, a bottom
line. It is internal legitimacy.
All versions of managed innovation call for greater precision
in the measurement of results. In technology, this makes great
sense because we want software, medicine, and machines to do
what they are supposed to do. The problem is exporting this
logic to the murky world of human behavior and collective
action. Virtually all research on the subject indicates that the
challenges to precise measurement of performance in the public
and nonprofit sectors are legion. On this point, I am partial to
the wisdom of Sir Josiah Stamp (1927):
Public agencies are very keen on amassing statistics —
they collect them, add them, raise them to the nth
power, take the cube roots, and prepare wonderful 
diagrams. But what you must never forget is that every
one of those figures comes in the first instance from
the village watchman, who just puts down what he
damn pleases.
All effective organizations must have precise revenues,
expenditures, budgets, and instruments of measuring how 
well they are accomplishing their purposes. But, following 
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managed-innovation assumptions, it is understood that 
performance measures are exactly that — measures — 
and that they only represent reality. They are subject to 
scrutiny, to debate, and even to dismissal if they are nonsense.
Performance measures seldom answer questions; they are
questions. Under conditions of institutional innovation it is far
better to approximate an answer to an important, if not fully
defined, question than to search for an exact answer to an
unimportant question simply because precise measurement is
possible. Such answers can always be made more precise;
they are still answers to the unimportant questions.
Values. No difference between the logic of managed 
innovation and sustained innovation is greater than their 
contrasting assumptions regarding values. Sustained-innovation
values are understood to be historical, natural, shared, and
enduring. Individuals, it is assumed, are attracted to the 
institution, at least in part, because of the values they see in 
its purposes. There is, for example, ample evidence that 
individuals, if given an open choice, will choose to associate
with institutions that bolster their own beliefs and characteris-
tics. Persons who go into social work, teaching, accounting,
law, business management, the ministry, and public service 
differ. It has long been understood that institutions are not 
only places where people work together and share values, but 
also systems of shared meanings, a common language, and
strongly reciprocal individual-institutional linkages by which
institutional values influence the individual and vice versa.
Institutional systems of shared meanings are layered, historical,
evolving, autonomous work cultures that take on a natural
organic quality. Such systems carry the institution’s values 
and generally reflect the values of those who make up the 
institution. Such organizations are sometimes described as
strong-culture institutions. Most research indicates that the
effective management of strong-culture institutions is usually
homegrown and guided by what Olsen, et al. call “the 
gardener” — which is to say, someone who is very familiar with
all parts of the gardening process, works with what is at hand
in the appropriate seasons, anticipates drought and insects and,
at the harvest, is prepared for the next season. The gardener
tends to the values of the garden by managing the garden.
Leaders, following managed-innovation assumptions, assume
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not only management of the garden but also set its values.
Examples of continuing innovation in strong-culture organiza-
tions in the private sector would include Nordstrom’s culture of
customer service, Ben and Jerry’s social agenda, Procter and
Gamble’s attention to employee well-being, and Southwest
Airline’s emphasis on both fun and bargain fares. Public-sector
strong-culture organizations include NASA, particularly in the
1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Forest Service,
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in recent years the Social Security
Administration, the General Accounting Office, and many police
and fire departments. Strong culture in the nonprofit sector
includes most large research universities and many leading liberal
arts colleges, most large-scale philanthropies and many interest-
based organizations such as the NRA and NOW. All reflect a 
continuing emphasis on a set of agreed-upon values and shared
meanings. The problem is, they are also iron cages.
Strong-culture institutions do change and can encourage inno-
vation, but they will resist attempts to manage the processes of
change and innovation. Great strong-culture institutional leaders
are both in the institution and of the institution, unquestioned
adherents to its shared meanings. Such leaders can carefully and
patiently nurture the processes of change and keep open the
prospects for innovation.
Propensity to Risk and to Innovate. Results are never 
neutral and all solutions have some negative side-effects.
Organizations in the modern marketplace, particularly in 
high technology, lean strongly in the direction of rapid change,
strong leadership, a transient workforce, and the logic of man-
aged innovation.They trade worker loyalty, brand identification,
and long-term institution-building for rapid response and high
flexibility. Management consultants and strong leaders in such
settings may claim that they can do it without these tradeoffs,
but the evidence is to the contrary. Businesses in more stable
markets tend to exhibit fewer tradeoffs and institutionalize 
more — Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, and General Electric,
for example.
Government institutions are, by definition, more stable and
permanent, obviously giving away some rapid response, some
malleability and, because of the separation of powers, some
strong singular leadership, in return for order and predictability.
Many of those who would import business reforms to govern-
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ment, including TQM and managed innovation, will claim they
can somehow obviate these tradeoffs. The evidence is not 
with them.
For our purposes, we must ask if one institutional type is
more inclined to creativity, originality, and innovation than the
other. The answer is that the two types are differently original
and innovative. The threat of competition does appear to 
stimulate innovation in short, rapid cycles, particularly in the
high-technology marketplace. But it also results in the iron
cage of isomorphism. Innovations in the public sector tend to
be slower, take longer, and last longer. Governments build
their own iron cages, but it should not be assumed that gov-
ernments are not creative or innovative. Just like businesses,
some are and some are not.
Nonprofits are highly varied, ranging from rather stable
institutions such as foundations and universities, to highly
volatile human service contract organizations. The forms of
innovation and tradeoff appear to be determined by context —
nonmarket nonprofits acting more like public institutions in
their innovative behavior and market-style nonprofits acting
more like businesses. How they respond to the logic of 
managed innovation depends on their context, their culture,
their leadership, and whether they seek short-run or long-
range innovation. But nonprofits and even foundations appear
to be homogenizing, converging, and entering the iron cage
because rewards in the form of reputational capital go to the
highly ranked, not the deviant.
IX
In the relentless tide of reform and the search for innova-
tion, nothing better illustrates the weakness of benchmarking
and managed innovation than the latest idea. That idea, the 
balanced scorecard, is the brainchild of Robert Kaplan and
David Norton (1996). Balanced scoring, not unlike grading 
or ranking, is used to measure not only the obvious financial 
bottom line in the short run, but also the effectiveness of 
management and employee growth and learning. Scoring is
balanced, implying that benchmarking and managed innovation
is not balanced because of its lack of attention to employee
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growth, participative forms of organization, and organizational
stability. Balanced scorecard advocates argue that too many
organizations are underinvested in their employees and in
issues of employee security and satisfaction. Better scores on
investments in training, professional involvement, community
participation, and workforce stability will, it is claimed, sharply
improve the prospects for continuing innovation. Such an 
argument is also a critique of benchmarking. In the balanced
scorecard, the emphasis on best practice is only in terms 
of comparative scores and not in terms of borrowing the 
innovations of others or directly presuming to manage innova-
tion. Both are connected to the logic of ranking and lead to 
homogenization rather than differentiation.
The balanced scorecard is increasingly popular with manage-
ment consultants and the businesses that hire them. The 
balanced scorecard has migrated to government and nonprofit
organizations much as TQM and benchmarking did. The 
isomorphic effects of balanced scorecards are under way.
Innovation is both feasible and necessary. But serious organi-
zational innovation is neither easy nor cheap. The primary
work of the public and nonprofit sectors is to achieve public
interest and to serve the people. Innovation in the service 
of the public interest should not be cheated. The potent 
mixture of rankings, performance measurement, and the logic
of managed innovation cheats real, lasting innovation. In the 
same way that the overemphasis on testing and the linking of
testing to ranking and status has caused schools and colleges 
to teach to the test, the assumptions of institutional rankings
and prizes combined with the logic of managed innovation
reduces the probability of innovation and especially lasting
innovation. (Lehman, 1999; Sacks, 2000). To weaken the iron
cage, it is essential to break the weld that links the instinct 
for organizational innovation to rankings, prizes, status, and
legitimacy. Once that weld is broken, the organization can
worry less about legitimacy and prestige and more about gen-
uine creativity. Only then, can it break out of the iron cage.
Virtually all the empirical evidence is to the effect that public-
sector and nonprofit creativity is more likely, more enduring,
and more effective when it follows the logic of sustained 
innovation. It is the way to ameliorate the effects of the iron
cage, to become genuinely creative, original, and innovative.
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